We are not entirely unprepared for the analysis of anxiety. Of course it still remains obscure how this is connected ontologically with fear. Obviously these are kindred phenomena. This is betokened by the fact that for the most part they have not been distinguished from one another: that which is fear, gets designated as "anxiety", while that which has the character of anxiety, gets called "fear". We shall try to proceed towards the phenomenon of anxiety step by step.

Dasein’s falling into the “they” and the ‘world’ of its concern, is what we have called a ‘fleeing’ in the face of itself. But one is not necessarily fleeing whenever one shrinks back in the face of something or turns away from it. Shrinking back in the face of what fear discloses—in the face of something threatening—is founded upon fear; and this shrinking back has the character of fleeing. Our Interpretation of fear as a state-of-mind has shown that in each case that in the face of which we fear is a detrimental entity within-the-world which comes from some definite region but is close by and is bringing itself close, and yet might stay away. In falling, Dasein turns away from itself. That in the face of which it thus shrinks back must, in any case, be an entity with the character of threatening; yet this entity has the same kind of Being as the one that shrinks back: it is Dasein itself. That in the face of which it thus shrinks back cannot be taken as something 'fearsome', for anything 'fearsome' is always encountered as an entity within-the-world. The only threatening which can be 'fearsome' and which gets discovered in fear, always comes from entities within-the-world.

Thus the turning-away of falling is not a fleeing that is founded upon a fear of entities within-the-world. Fleeing that is so grounded is still less a character of this turning-away, when what this turning-away does is precisely to turn thither towards entities within-the-world by absorbing itself in them. The turning-away of falling is grounded rather in anxiety, which in turn is what first makes fear possible.

To understand this talk about Dasein’s fleeing in the face of itself in falling, we must recall that Being-in-the-world is a basic state of Dasein. That in the face of which one has anxiety [das Wovor der Angst] is Being-in-the-world as such. What is the difference phenomenally between that in the face of which anxiety is anxious [sich angstet] and that in the face of which fear is afraid? That in the face of which one has anxiety is not an entity within-the-world. Thus it is essentially incapable of having an involvement. This threatening does not have the character of a definite detrimentality which reaches what is threatened, and which reaches it with definite regard to a special factical potentiality-for-Being. That in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite. Not only does this indefiniteness leave factically undecided which entity within-the-world is threatening us, but it also tells us that entities within-the-world are not 'relevant' at all. Nothing which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within the world functions as that in the face of which anxiety is anxious. Here the totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand discovered within-the-world, is, as such, of no consequence; it collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking significance. In anxiety one does not encounter this thing or that thing which, as something threatening, must have an involvement.

Accordingly, when something threatening brings itself close, anxiety does not ‘see’ any definite ‘here’ or ‘yonder’ from which it comes. That in the face of which one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is nowhere. Anxiety ‘does not know’ what that in the face of which it is anxious is. ‘Nowhere’, however, does not signify nothing: this is where any region lies, and there too lies any disclosedness of the world for essentially spatial Being-in. Therefore that which threatens cannot bring itself close from a definite direction within what is close by; it is already ‘there’, and yet nowhere; it is so close that it is oppressive and stifles one’s breath, and yet it is nowhere.

In that in the face of which one has anxiety, the ‘It is nothing and nowhere’ becomes manifest. The obstinacy of the “nothing and nowhere within-the-world” means as a phenomenon that the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety. The utter insignificance which makes itself known in the “nothing and nowhere”, does not signify that the world is absent, but tells us that entities within-the-world are of so little importance in themselves that on the basis of this insignificance of what is within-the-world, the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself.

What oppresses us is not this or that, nor is it the summation of everything present-at-hand; it is rather the possibility of the ready-to-hand in general: that is to say, it is the world itself. When anxiety has subsided, then in our everyday way of talking we are accustomed to say that ‘it was really nothing’. And what it was, indeed, does get reached ontically by such a way of talking. Everyday discourse tends towards concerning itself with the ready-to-hand and talking about it. That in the face of which anxiety is anxious is nothing ready-to-hand within-the-world. But this
"nothing ready-to-hand", which only our everyday circumstantial discourse understands, is not totally nothing. The "nothing" of readiness-to-hand is grounded in the most primordial 'something' - in the world. Ontologically, however, the world belongs essentially to Dasein's Being as Being-in-the-world. So if the "nothing" - that is, the world as such - exhibits itself as that in the face of which one has anxiety, this means that Being-in-the-world itself is in the face of which anxiety is anxious.

Being-anxious discloses, primordially and directly, the world as world. It is not the case, say, that the world first gets thought of by deliberating about it, just by itself, without regard for the entities within-the-world, and that, in the face of this world, anxiety then arises; what is rather the case is that the world as world is disclosed first and foremost by anxiety, as a mode of state-of-mind. This does not signify, however, that in anxiety the worldliness of the world gets conceptualized.

Anxiety is not only anxiety in the face of something, but, as a state-of-mind, it is also anxiety about something. That which anxiety is profoundly anxious [sich abangstet] about is not a definite kind of Being for Dasein or a definite possibility for it. Indeed the threat itself is indefinable, and therefore cannot penetrate threateningly to this or that factically concrete potentiality-for-Being. That which anxiety is anxious about is Being-in-the-world itself. In anxiety what is environmentally ready-to-hand sinks away, and so, in general, do entities within-the-world. The 'world' can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with of Others. Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the 'world' and the way things have been publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about - its authentic potentiality for Being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities. Therefore, with that which it is anxious about, anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, and indeed as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualized in individualization [vereinzeltes in der Vereinzelung].

Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being - that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for (propensio in ...) the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is. But at the same time, this is the

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1 'Allein dieses Nichts von Zuhandenem, das die alltagliche unsichtige Rede einzig versteht, ist kein totales Nichts.' This sentence is grammatically ambiguous.

2 'Die Angst bringt das Dasein vor sein Freiheit für .. (propensio in ..) die Eigentlichkeit seines Seins als Möglichkeit, die es immer schon ist.'
lost in the "they", can dwell in tranquilized familiarity. When in falling
we flee into the "at-home" of publicness, we flee in the face of the "not-at-
home"; that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in Dasein
—in Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world, which has been delivered over
to itself in its Being. This uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly, and is a
threat to its everyday lostness in the "they", though not explicitly. This
threat can go together factically with complete assurance and self-
sufficiency in one's everyday concern. Anxiety can arise in the most
innocuous Situations. Nor does it have any need for darkness, in which it
is commonly easier for one to feel uncanny. In the dark there is emphatic-
ally 'nothing' to see, though the very world itself is still 'there', and 'there'
mere obtrusively.

If we interpret Dasein's uncanniness from an existential-ontological
point of view as a threat which reaches Dasein itself and which comes
from Dasein itself, we are not contending that in factual anxiety too it
has always been understood in this sense. When Dasein "understands"
uncanniness in the everyday manner, it does so by turning away from it in
falling; in this turning-away, the "not-at-home" gets 'dimmed down'.
Yet the everydayness of this fleeing shows phenomenally that anxiety, as
a basic state-of-mind, belongs to Dasein's essential state of Being-in-the-
world, which, as one that is existential, is never present-at-hand but is
itself always in a mode of factual Being-there—that is, in the mode of
a state-of-mind. That kind of Being-in-the-world which is tranquilized
and familiar is a mode of Dasein's uncanniness, not the reverse. From an
existential-ontological point of view, the "not-at-home" must be conceived as the more
primordial phenomenon.

And only because anxiety is always latent in Being-in-the-world, can
such Being-in-the-world, as Being which is alongside the 'world' and which is
conscious in its state-of-mind, ever be afraid. Fear is anxiety, fallen
into the 'world', inauthentic, and, as such, hidden from itself.

After all, the mood of uncanniness remains, factically, something for
which we mostly have no existentiell understanding. Moreover, under the
ascendancy of falling and publicness, 'real' anxiety is rare. Anxiety
is often conditioned by 'physiological' factors. This fact, in its facticity, is
a problem ontologically, not merely with regard to its ontical causation
and course of development. Only because Dasein is anxious in the very depths
of its Being, does it become possible for anxiety to be elicited physio-
logically.

Even rarer than the existentiell Fact of "real" anxiety are attempts to

1 Here we follow the earlier editions in reading 'Da-seins'. In the later editions the
hyphen appears ambiguously at the end of a line.